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LAW SCHOOL DEVELOPMENTS
Once a year, this department will carry figures on law school registration. In addition it will provide a mediu, for the description of
experiments in curriculo, teaching method, and administration. Like
"commnents," the typical law school development note will be characterized by brevity and informality; unlike them, it will be descriptive
rather than argumentative and will deal primarily with devices which

have been tested in actual operation.

A PEDAGOGICAL DISCOVERY VIA
THE SEMINAR
JnRoM.

HALL*

Before recounting my discovery, I should like to say a word or two about
the setting in which it occurred-namely, the seminar program at Indiana.
Two years ago the Indiana law faculty decided to require each student, in
addition to taking a research course and writing an essay, to take at least one
seminar-two semester hours. The curriculum is so arranged that any faculty member, desiring to do so, can offer at least one seminar. The plan has
been a signal success. It adds flexibility to the curriculum, permits students
to engage in some specialization, has the advantages of small-group study, and
gives the instructor an opportunity to advance his current research by
paralleling it with the problems of the seminar. Not the least satisfaction is
the surprisingly good work of many otherwise average students when they
are studying the field of their particular interest under stimulation of the
methods of the seminar. The sheer quantity of work that such students often
do, quite without disciplinary pressure, is amazing.
All of this may be old stuff for teachers in a few schools; but the experience at Indiana may have significance for those faculties which have not
heretofore included seminars in their curricula. At Indiana, we are now facing the next step of carefully appraising the seminar program; but, in my
opinion, we have had sufficient experience with it to warrant the above praise
and definite recommendation of this method of instruction.
Now, for my discovery. What I discovered in the second semester of
1949 was that the best way to do the pedagogical job of inter-discipline
study-law in relation to the social sciences, liberal legal education, multidiscipline analysis, or by whatever other term it may be designated-is to
bring able students from various departments into a seminar and, if possible, to have the class evenly divided between such students and the law
students. Let me add some facts to give point and content to this communication.
After a goodly number of years of studying the problems of inter-discipline analysis and after considerable experimentation in it (a few social
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science students were almost always in my classes) I had rather undeliberately but slowly and with increasing conviction come to the conclusion that
the only sound method of liberalizing the study of law lay in the person of
the broadly cultivated legal scholar. That remains the core of my opinion
in the matter-with some allowance for the exceptional social theorist who
masters a branch of law. (On reflection, this is hardly a qualification of the
above assertion since such scholars, in effect, give themselves a sufficient
legal education; hence, without formal degrees they function as "broadly cultivated legal scholars.") This method-inhering simply in qualified legal
personnel-has, in my experience, proved sounder than the collaboration
of a legal scholar and a social scientist in the classroom and, a fortliori, it is
far superior to merely sending law students to the college or graduate school
for study concurrent with the law school work. Least valuable is the drafting of ambitious programs-the amount of time and energy that has gone into
such paper-making, only to end in defeat and frustration when the question
of personnel is faced, must be enormous. And it is also the best way to discourage any attempt to liberalize the teaching of law.
While I remain convinced that personnel is paramount, I have learned
that it is not the only available resource to implement the indicated objective.
I have learned how the personnel can function effectively. As indicated,
the method is the seminar, constituted as stated above.
When it fell to me to offer a seminar in the spring of 1949, I decided to
make Plato's Philosophy of Law the subject of the course (the subject matter of the seminar will be different each year). I hoped that three or four
students among the class which had just completed the course in jurisprudence might take the seminar. I made no announcement of the course
other than posting a required notice on the law school bulletin board toward
the end of the first semester. A colleague in the Philosophy Department
somehow learned about it and, over luncheon, we discussed the possible content of the course, how it might supplement the Department's course in
Plato, and the like. Soon after our conference, three philosophy "majors"
called on me, and we discussed more or less tentative plans.. One of these
students was also taking a course in political theory, and he asked and received my permission to inform other students in that class about the Plato
seminar. Three or four of them called on me for particulars, evincing the
caution of a careful buyer and also some effect of the common propaganda
that law school work is technical. From these students, others learned about
the course. Our policy is to limit the maximum size of seminars to twelve
students but, although admission was denied to several, uncertainty as to the
number who would register and the desire to admit all the well qualified
students led to the enrollment of seventeen-two of whom were "scared out"
in the first meeting. The remaining fifteen students settled down to the work
of the seminar, meeting once each week for a two-hour period-with hardly
an absence during the semester.
Brief comment on the students and the methods of the seminar may be of
interest. Of the fifteen students, seven were law students, one of them,
Chinese, another, Turkish, and the remaining five had taken the course in
jurisprudence; of the eight non-law students, four were graduate students of
philosophy, government, or history, one of them, an instructor in the Phil-
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osophy Department, and another, a mature, very able graduate of the University of Beirut; and four were superior senior undergraduates, studying
in the above fields.
The first two meetings were devoted largely to lectures on ju~isprudence,
with references to possible approaches to Plato from the viewpoint of
modem legal philosophy, to answering questions, arranging the work for the
next three meetings, and assigning reports. Thereafter, we proceeded mainly
by way of reports, presented each time by two or three students, selecting the
subjects with a view to their special competence and the agenda of the
seminar. The reporters were interrupted frequently by questions and opposing arguments which sometimes spread to include practically the entire
group and lasted past the time for quitting. The instructor interpolated at
strategic points; but a serious effort was made, not always successfully, to
maintain the position of a sixteenth member of the seminar; and all of us
were seated on the same level around a large table.
Thus, e. g., our history students brought us information about ancient
Greece with particular reference to the Dialogues. In connection with the
Minos, especially the statement that law "tends to be . . . reality," it

became necessary to know what Plato meant by "reality." We decided to
limit our inquiry to Theatetus and the Republic, and two of the philosophy
students reported to us on that difficult question. The law students were
interested in reporting on the Apology and the Crito, especially in comparing our procedure with that of ancient Greece. Those who had taken the
course in jurisprudence reported on various other dialogues, especially the
Statesman, Minos, and the Laws, from the perspective of that course. And
when we later came to conclude the seminar with a closer consideration of
the Laws, the Turkish student and an American student compared Plato's
discourse with the law of their respective countries; and the Chinese student
compared Plato and Confucius. The non-law students were especially
pleased to learn about many matters which they could not study in other
courses, e. g., the relationship of Plato's Laws and the positive law of various countries to problems concerning universals, diffusion, and culture; the
problems of administration and "rule of law" discussed in the Republic and
the Statesman, and so on. After due discount of kind and generous remarks with which students are prone to reward their teachers, I believe the
seminar was both very interesting and very much worth while for all who
participated in it.
In the course of preparing their various reports, the nonrlaw students,
without any suggestion from me and, indeed, without my knowledge, consulted their professors in the philosophy, history, and government departments-about what to read in addition to the assignment, how to "get their
specialty across" to the seminar, etc. The net effect was an indirect collaboration between those scholars and the instructor of the seminar-an interrelation of knowledge and skills via the mediation of the student facing a
particular problem of legal philosophy and subjecting his contribution to
group criticism.
I cannot here detail the reasons for attaching great significance to the
venture, described above. To those who have thought and planned about the
integration of various disciplines, I can only say that I learned that an im-
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portant, indeed, the most important, method of pursuing integrative study is
to get students of the social sciences and humanities to sit side by side with
law students in a seminar. They learn much from each other; and the law
professor is stimulated to contribute what he can in this process of intercommunication. In short, instead of building from the top with faculty,
the best thing to do, I am now persuaded, is to build from the "bottom"with students.
All of this is very simple, is it not? Not at all like the formal functioning of faculty committees and subcommittees, or the drafting of elaborate
programs, or the detailed reports and resolutions, following the familiar procedures of academicians. Given a legal scholar interested in inter-discipline
study, in the course of time he and his work become known to his colleagues
in the social sciences and humanities. That condition already exists in many
schools. Then make it possible for the legal scholar to give a seminar each
year. As the subject matter of the seminar, let him select a field of study
which is of interest to both law students and students in social sciences
and the humanities (or business or other fields). Instead of the operation of
chance, which led to the experiment described above, let him inform his colleagues in those departments, especially those interested in the interrelation of
disciplines, of the seminar, and what he hopes to accomplish there. They
will do the rest. The next step, I suppose, will be the regularization of what
started as a spontaneous act of cooperation among scholars in different departments and schools of the university.

